April 3, 2018 | 12:30pm-2
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
Rome Building 812
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036

State capacity is central to the provision of public goods, including environmental protection. Drawing on climate policymaking, this article argues that the division of labor between the bureaucracy and legislature in policy formulation is a critical source of state capacity. In cases of bureaucratic policy design, the legislature sets policy goals and delegates policy design to bureaucracies. This division of labor shifts distributional conflict to autonomous bureaucracies, allowing for effective policy design. California followed this path in climate policymaking, setting it on track to meet climate goals. In cases of legislative policy design, bureaucracies set goals and legislatures design policy measures. Since legislators have incentives to respond to vested interests, legislative policy design is vulnerable to regulatory capture. In Germany, legislative policy design in climate policymaking is preventing attainment of emissions reduction goals, as industry interests succeeded in blocking key policy measures. Our findings highlight procedural sources of state capacity.

Event Schedule
Introduction of Speaker

Speaker Presentation

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